We study the problem of surplus extraction in the general environment of McAfee and Reny (1992) , and provide two alternative proofs of their main theorem. The first is an analogue of the classic argument of McLean (1985, 1988), using geometric features of the set of agents' beliefs to construct a menu of contracts extracting the desired surplus. This argument, which requires a finite state space, also leads to a counterexample showing that full extraction is not possible without further significant conditions on agents' beliefs or surplus, even if the designer offers an infinite menu of contracts. The second argument uses duality and applies for an infinite state space, thus yielding the general result of McAfee and Reny (1992) . By providing a connection to duality, this argument suggests methods for studying surplus extraction in other models in which agents or the designer might have objectives other than risk-neutral value maximization.
Introduction
In most settings with asymmetric information, private information generates rents for the agents who hold it. This underlies many central results, such as the inefficiency of outcomes in many mechanisms. A series of important results by McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) proved that such rents can be fragile, however, and depend crucially on the assumption that agents' private information is independent. If instead agents' information is correlated, even only to an arbitrarily small degree, then appropriately designed mechanisms can typically leverage this correlation to extract all, or virtually all, information rents.
Crémer and McLean started this important strand of work. They considered the problem of surplus extraction in two particular settings, the monopolist screening problem (1985) , and private values auctions (1988), each with agents whose private information is summarized by finitely many types. McAfee and Reny (1992) instead consider a very general environment, and allow for infinitely many types. McAfee and Reny (1992) show that a natural analogue of Crémer and McLean's convex independence condition on beliefs is necessary and sufficient for virtual surplus extraction in this class of environments, meaning that for every ε > 0 a designer can offer a finite menu of contracts leaving each agent with no more than ε surplus.
As McAfee and Reny argue, considering the infinite type case is not merely a technical exercise in mathematical completeness, but is of central importance for understanding the explanatory power of the finite model and its ability to approximate the infinite case. Although McAfee and Reny's conditions are natural analogues of Crémer and McLean's for the infinite case, their result is in no sense a limit of Crémer and McLean's, and they establish their result by a significantly different argument, from which a connection to the finite case is not clear. Crémer and McLean's result that full extraction holds in the finite case can be proven constructively using the separating hyperplane theorem, while McAfee and Reny's proof that virtual extraction holds in the infinite case relies on their elegant generalization of the classic Stone-Weierstrass approximation theorem. More importantly, from their work and subsequent work, it is unclear whether the gap between virtual and full extraction is due to the restriction to a finite menu of contracts, or is instead an integral consequence of allowing for infinitely many types.
In this paper we provide two alternative proofs of the main theorem of McAfee and Reny (1992) . Each provides insight into connections between the finite and infinite types models, including the extent to which the finite model approximates the infinite one, as well as suggesting novel techniques and results. The first is a natural analogue of the argument of Crémer and McLean, using geometric features of the set of agents' beliefs to explicitly construct a menu of contracts extracting the desired surplus. This argument requires a finite set of states over which agents are uncertain. By highlighting the connection to the geometry of the set of beliefs, this argument also leads to a counterexample showing that full extraction is not possible without further significant conditions on agents' beliefs or surplus, even if the designer offers an infinite menu of contracts. This argument also leads to novel results on the geometry of finite-dimensional convex sets.
The second argument is based on duality, using the characterization of extraction as the existence of a solution to a particular family of inequalities. This argument, while not constructive, applies for an infinite state space, and thus yields the general result of McAfee and Reny (1992) . By providing a connection to duality, this argument suggests a method for studying surplus extraction in other models in which agents or the designer might have objectives other than risk-neutral value maximization.
Our use of duality in the surplus extraction problem is inspired by and builds on the work of Rahman (2012) , which introduced duality arguments to study surplus extraction in arbitrary type spaces. Rahman (2012) argues that full surplus extraction holds under an analogue of convex independence in a setting with general type spaces allowing the designer to offer an infinite menu of contracts, and that this setting includes the environment of McAfee and Reny (1992) as a special case. We show by example that full extraction can fail under the assumptions of McAfee and Reny (1992), even allowing for an infinite menu of contracts. The two proofs we provide shed some light on why virtual extraction holds while full extraction can fail, and the extent to which duality arguments can be used to study surplus extraction in environments more general than the standard model. Other recent papers have also emphasized the importance of duality for different mechanism design questions. This includes work on multidimensional screening using optimal transport methods by Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2017), and work on optimal auction design under robustness concerns by Carroll and Segal (2018) and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017a, b).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we give some preliminary definitions and results from convex analysis that will be used throughout the paper. In section 3 we set up the basic model and definitions, including notions of surplus extraction. In section 4 we consider the case in which the state space is finite. We give a necessary condition for full extraction, and use this to derive a counterexample showing that full extraction can fail under the assumptions of McAfee and Reny (1992), even if the designer can offer an infinite menu of contracts. We then give a constructive proof that virtual extraction holds in this setting. In section 5 we consider the case in which the state space can be infinite, and provide a proof of the general virtual extraction result based on duality. Additional results, some of which might be of independent interest, are collected in the appendix.
Preliminaries
We recall and collect here some preliminary definitions and results from convex analysis. Definition 1. Let C ⊆ R n be a convex set. An extreme point of C is a point x ∈ C with the property that if x = αy + (1 − α)z for some y, z ∈ C and some α ∈ [0, 1], then x = y or x = z.
An exposed point of C is a point x ∈ C such that there is some real linear functional f on R n such that f (y) < f (x) for all y ∈ C with y = x.
Note: Every exposed point is an extreme point, but the converse does not hold. That is, extreme points need not be exposed. If C has only finitely many extreme points, however, then every extreme point of C is exposed.
Definition 2. A nonempty subset F ⊆ C of a convex set C is a face of C if whenever x, y ∈ C and αx + (1 − α)y ∈ F for some α ∈ (0, 1), then x, y ∈ F . A face F of C is a proper face if it is a proper subset of C.
Definition 3.
A nonempty subset E ⊆ C of a convex set C ⊆ R n is an exposed set of C if there is a real linear functional f on R n such that f (y) ≤ f (x) for all x, y ∈ C with x ∈ E, and f (y) < f (x) if y ∈ E.
Note: An exposed set is a face, but a face need not be exposed.
Definition 4. Let C ⊆ R n be a convex set and let W ⊆ R n be the unique affine subspace of R n such that C ⊆ W and such that C has a nonempty relative interior in W . The dimension of C, denoted dim C, is the dimension of W .
We record a useful result that connects these concepts next.
n be a compact convex set, and F ⊆ C be a proper face of C. If dim C = ℓ, then dim F < ℓ. Finally, note that if C ⊆ R n is a compact, convex set with dim C = 1, then C has finitely many extreme points (at most 2), and thus all extreme points of C are exposed.
Set-up and Extraction Notions
In this section we lay out the basic set-up and notation used throughout the paper, and give the definitions of surplus extraction underlying the main results.
We follow standard notation throughout. For a compact metric space B, C(B) is the space of continuous real-valued functions on B, and M(B) is the space of finite signed Borel measures on B. Similarly, ∆(B) is the space of Borel probability measures on B.
Throughout, for x ∈ C(B) and η ∈ M(B), we write x · η = η · x for the inner product x, η = η, x , that is,
We follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in giving a reduced form description of the surplus extraction problem. In a prior, unmodeled stage, agents play a game that leaves them with some information rents as a function of their private information. Private information is summarized by the type t ∈ T , where T denotes the set of possible types. Unless specified otherwise, we let T = [0, 1] be the set of types (for all of the results it suffices that T is a compact, convex metric space). The current stage also has an exogenous source of uncertainty, summarized by a set of states S, on which contract payments can depend. For some applications, it is natural to take S = T , although we follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in allowing S to be arbitrary. We assume throughout that S is a compact metric space. To each type t ∈ T is then associated a value v(t) ∈ R, representing the rents from the prior stage, and beliefs π(t) ∈ ∆(S). Throughout we maintain the assumption that v : T → R is continuous and that π : T → ∆(S) is norm continuous.
Let
C := co{π(t) ∈ ∆(S) : t ∈ T } Following our general notation, let ∆(T ) be the set of Borel probability measures on T . For t ∈ T , δ t ∈ ∆(T ) denotes the Dirac measure concentrated on t. For x ∈ C(T × S) and t ∈ T , we write x(t) ∈ C(S) for the function such that x(t)(s) = x(t, s) for each s ∈ S.
Next we give definitions for the main notions of surplus extraction in this setting, full extraction and virtual extraction. Both reflect the idea that the designer offers agents a menu of stochastic contracts from which they choose, based on minimizing their expected costs. Exploiting correlation between types and beliefs might allow the designer to construct such a menu that leaves every agent with zero expected surplus, in the case of full extraction, or no more than ε expected surplus for any ε > 0, in the case of virtual extraction.
Definition 5. Full extraction holds if, given v : T → R, there exists a collection {c(t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T } such that for each t ∈ T :
Virtual extraction holds if, given v : T → R, for each ε > 0 there exists a collection {c ε (t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T } such that for each t ∈ T :
As defined, full extraction or virtual extraction might require the designer to offer an infinite menu of contracts when T is infinite. In the case of virtual extraction, such a menu need not have an expected cost minimizing element for all agents. By allowing for an infinite menu of contracts, this might also appear to be a weaker notion of virtual extraction than considered by McAfee and Reny (1992), which instead shows that for each ε > 0, there is a finite menu {c 1 , . . . , c n } such that for each t ∈ T ,
We note, however, that whenever virtual extraction holds (using the definition above), then it is always possible to find a finite menu of contracts that would achieve the same bounds on surplus. We record this observation and its proof below. Theorem 2. If virtual extraction holds, then virtual extraction can be achieved with a finite menu of contracts. That is, given v : T → R, for each ε > 0 there exists a finite menu {c 1 , . . . , c n } ⊆ C(S) such that for each t ∈ T ,
Proof. Let v : T → R be given and fix ε > 0. Choose {c ε (t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T } such that for each t ∈ T :
Since T is compact and
and for each j = 1, . . . , n,
The result follows.
As with the original formulation of McAfee and Reny (1992), these notions of full and virtual extraction do not explicitly address incentive compatibility. When full extraction holds, incentive compatibility will follow. Incentive compatibility does not necessarily follow from virtual extraction, however; this would require that the menu of contracts satisfies the additional incentive constraints v(t)−π(t)·c(s) ≤ v(t)−π(t)·c(t) for all s, t ∈ T . An infinite menu of contracts might allow for virtual extraction while also satisfying incentive compatibility. Our results do not address this question directly, although they suggest that probabilistic independence is not sufficient to guarantee incentive compatibility, even with an infinite menu; this remains an open question.
Following Crémer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992), we consider conditions on beliefs under which full extraction or virtual extraction holds. McAfee and Reny (1992) show that virtual extraction is possible whenever beliefs satisfy the following condition.
Definition 6. Types satisfy probabilistic independence if for all t ∈ T :
Note: If types satisfy probabilistic independence, then π(t) is an extreme point of C for each t ∈ T .
Note: If T is finite, then probabilistic independence reduces to the standard convex independence condition of Crémer-McLean, that is
Crémer and McLean (1988) show that when T and S are finite, then full extraction holds whenever beliefs satisfy convex independence. This is no longer true when T is infinite, as the example in the next section illustrates. We sketch a standard argument for this classic result next, to motivate the main ideas we develop in the following sections.
Suppose T and S are finite, and types satisfy convex independence. Fix a type t ∈ T . Since types satisfy convex independence, π(t) ∈ co{π(s) : s ∈ T, s = t}. Thus there exists z(t) ∈ R S such that
That is, π(t) is an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T }, and of C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T }. Alternatively, by convex independence, {π(s) : s ∈ T } is the set of extreme points of C; since T is finite this set is finite, so each element π(t) must also be an exposed point of C. Now consider a contract of the form c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t) where α(t) ∈ R + , which requires the constant payment v(t) and a stochastic payment that is a scaled version of z(t) (throughout we use a constant r ∈ R interchangeably with the function r1(S), where 1(S) denotes the identity on S). For type t, this contract has expected cost v(t), as
while for types s = t, the expected cost is
Since π(s)·z(t) > 0 for all types s = t, the designer can take advantage of this difference in beliefs to set α(t) sufficiently large to make the resulting contract unattractive to all types s = t while keeping the expected cost constant for type t. To that end, set α(t) > 0 sufficiently large so that
Note that since π(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s = t and T is finite, the term on the right above is well-defined (the ratio is bounded), and thus α(t) is welldefined. Then for type t,
by choice of α(t). Repeating this construction for each type t ∈ T yields a menu {c(t) : t ∈ T } that achieves full extraction. Finally, if in addition |S| ≥ |T |, then convex independence is satisfied for almost all elements of ∆(S) T .
Finite State Space
In this section, we consider the case in which the state space S is finite. With abuse of notation, we use the symbol S interchangeably for the state space and its cardinality throughout this section.
Focusing on the simpler case in which S is finite leads to several important observations. First, we can connect the extraction problem to the underlying convex geometry, as in the setting with finitely many types. This lets us establish a more direct connection between the extraction problem with finitely many types and with infinitely many types. From this connection we identify a simple necessary condition for full extraction, based on the geometry of the set of beliefs {π(t) : t ∈ T }. This necessary condition sheds light on why probabilistic independence is no longer sufficient for full extraction with infinitely many types, and allows us to give an example to illustrate this breakdown. The example also sheds light on why virtual extraction holds nonetheless, and on the nature of types to whom some surplus might need to be left. Finally, these observations lead to a constructive proof that virtual extraction holds under probabilistic independence, analogous to classic arguments in the finite type case, in which we will explicitly construct a menu of contracts to achieve extraction of all but at most ε surplus for each ε > 0.
We start with the observation that if full extraction holds, then for each t ∈ T , π(t) must be an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T } and of C = co{π(s) :
Theorem 3. Let S be finite. If full extraction holds, then for each t ∈ T , π(t) is an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T } and of C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T }.
, where z(t) ∈ R S and with abuse of notation
Now take π ∈ C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T } ⊆ R S with π = π(t). Then by definition, there exists {t 1 , . . . , t n } ⊆ T and α 1 , . . . , α n > 0 with i α i = 1 such that π = i α i π(t i ). Since π = π(t), there exists i such that
Thus π(t) is an exposed point of C. Since t ∈ T was arbitrary, π(t) is an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T }, and of C = co{π(s) :
This observation motivates the following definition, reframing the necessary condition above in terms of agents' beliefs.
Note: Using this terminology, we can restate Theorem 3 as follows: when S is finite, full extraction requires that all types are detectable.
Note: Assuming probabilistic independence, a type t is detectable if and only if π(t) is an exposed point of C.
Next we give an example to illustrate the failure of full extraction when T is infinite. In the example, probabilistic independence is satisfied, but some types are not detectable.
Example: Let π : T → ∆(S) be as in Figure 1 , and suppose v(t) > v(0) for all t = 0. Note that for every t = 0, 1, π(t) is an exposed point of C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T }, while π(0) and π(1) are extreme points of C that are Figure 2 : Graph of C = co{π(t) : t ∈ T }; π(0) and π(1) are extreme points of C that are not exposed. not exposed. That is, t is detectable in T for all t = 0, 1, while types t = 0 and t = 1 are not detectable in T . See Figures 2 and 3 .
To see that these beliefs satisfy probabilistic independence, suppose
for some t ∈ T and µ ∈ ∆(T )
First suppose t ∈ {0, 1}. Then since π(t) is an exposed point of C, there exists z(t) ∈ R S such that π(t) · z(t) = 0 and
Now suppose t ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, there exists z(t) ∈ R S such that
Then as above,
But since both π(0) and π(1) are extreme points of C, this implies µ = δ t .
Thus beliefs satisfy probabilistic independence. Full extraction does not hold, however, by Theorem 3, since π(0) and π(1) are not exposed points in C, that is, types t = 0 and t = 1 are not detectable in T .
In this case, it is not difficult to see directly why full extraction fails. As above, suppose v(t) > v(0) for all t = 0. Notice in particular this implies v(1) > v(0), so the surplus of type 1 is greater than the surplus of type 0. Now 
Here, however, if π(0) · z = 0 and π(s) · z ≥ 0 for all s ∈ T , it must be the case that π(1) · z = 0 as well (see Figure 3) . But then the contract c(0) must leave type 1 with strictly positive surplus, as
So any contract that extracts full surplus from type 0 and does not provide surplus to other types t ∈ (0, 1) must leave strictly positive surplus for type 1. ♦ Although full extraction is not possible in this example, virtual extraction is. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the idea, and also illustrate that it might Figure 4 : Construction of c(t) when π(t) is an exposed point of C. be necessary to give small rents to some types close to a type that is not detectable in order to extract surplus from other types from which that type cannot be distinguished. We sketch the argument here, which then serves as the template for the general constructive proof we give below.
First, consider the case of t ∈ {0, 1}, so t is detectable in T and π(t) is an exposed point of C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T }. Then there exists z(t) ∈ R S such that π(t) · z(t) = 0 and π(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s = t See Figure 4 . Following the idea of the proof for the finite types case, consider a contract of the form c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t) that requires the constant payment v(t) and a stochastic payment some scaled version of z(t). For type t, this contract has expected cost v(t):
π (0) π(1) Figure 5 : Leaving some surplus for types close to t = 0 might be necessary to extract surplus from type t = 1.
As in the finite case, to make this contract unattractive to types s = t, we would like to set α(t) > 0 sufficiently large so that
The term on the right need not be finite with infinitely many types, however (indeed, both the denominator and the numerator go to 0 as s → t), so this scaling term need not be defined. For types sufficiently close to t, however, the difference in values v(s) − v(t) is small, so the surplus such types could gain by choosing the contract c(t) is small, as
Given ε > 0, we can find δ > 0 such that s − t < δ ⇒ v(s) − v(t) < ε.
Since the set of types in T with s − t ≥ δ is compact, we can now choose α(t) > 0 sufficiently large so that
For the resulting contract c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t),
Now consider t ∈ {0, 1}, and without loss of generality take t = 0. First note that, as depicted in Figure 3 , there exists z(0) ∈ R S such that
Then consider T 1 = {0, 1} and
is an exposed point, thus there exists z 1 (0) ∈ R S such that
See Figures 6 and 7 . Mimicking the construction in the previous case for a detectable type, choose α 1 (0) > 0 sufficiently large so that
π (0) π (1) z 1 (0) Figure 7 : Construction of c 1 (0).
By construction,
The contract c 1 (0) might leave surplus to some types t ∈ {0, 1}, however. To take care of this, we can use the additional stochastic payment z(0), which type 0 and type 1 believe has expected value of zero. Since all other types believe z(0) has positive expected value, we can appropriately scale z(0) to ensure that no more than ε expected surplus is left for all such types, as follows.
Note that the surplus c 1 (0) leaves to types arbitrarily close to 0 must be arbitrarily small, since c 1 (0) leaves zero surplus for type 0. Then choose 
Then set
For t ∈ {0, 1}, again by construction,
The collection {c(t) : t ∈ T } thus constructed achieves extraction of all but at most ε surplus. Now we will show that an analogous construction works in general whenever probabilistic independence is satisfied to yield a collection of contracts that achieves virtual extraction. Proof. Let v : T → R be given. Fix ε > 0. We will construct a menu {c(s) ∈ C(S) : s ∈ T } such that for each t ∈ T , v(t) − π(t) · c(t) = 0 and v(t) − π(t) · c(s) ≤ ε for each s = t. We consider the construction for a detectable type first, and then consider the case of types that are not detectable.
Case 1: Consider first the case in which t ∈ T is detectable. In this case, choose z(t) ∈ R S such that
Note that α(t) is well-defined (i.e., finite) since {s ∈ T : s − t ≥ δ} is compact, v and π are continuous, and π(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s = t.
Then define a contract c(t) as follows (here and in what follows, we use the constant r ∈ R interchangeably with the constant vector (r, . . . , r) ∈ R S ):
Now for type t:
Thus for all types s = t:
Case 2: Now consider the case in which type t 1 ∈ T is not detectable. Since π(t 1 ) is an extreme point of C but not an exposed point, there exists z(t 1 ) ∈ R S such that
Note that T 1 is compact, and since t 1 is not detectable, T 1 must contain some elements other than t 1 .
Note that C 1 ⊆ C is compact and convex, C 1 is a proper face of C, and co{π(t) : t ∈ T 1 } ⊆ C 1 . In addition, since C 1 ⊆ C, π(t 1 ) is an extreme point of C 1 . As such, π(t 1 ) is either an exposed point of C 1 , or an extreme point of C 1 that is not exposed. We consider the two cases in turn.
First suppose π(t 1 ) is an exposed point of C 1 . This implies π(t 1 ) is an exposed point of co{π(t) : t ∈ T 1 }, and in particular, that t 1 is detectable in T 1 . Repeating the construction in Case 1, there exists z 1 (t 1 ) ∈ R S and α 1 (t 1 ) > 0 such that, with
we have
Then for every t ∈ T 1 , there exists δ(t) > 0 such that
The collection {B δ(t) (t) : t ∈ T 1 } is an open cover of T 1 , and T 1 is compact, so there exists {t 1 , . . . , t m } such that
And by construction, for all t ∈ ∪ j B δ(t j ) (t j ),
From above, note that
Now choose α 2 (t 1 ) > 0 such that
Then set the contract c(t 1 ) to be
For each t ∈ T 1 :
Thus for every t ∈ T 1 ,
For t ∈ T \ T 1 :
Thus for all t ∈ T \ {t 1 }:
is not an exposed point of C 1 , then repeating this argument for the construction of C 1 and T 1 , there is a sequence {C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n } with C 0 = C, C n = {π(t 1 )}, where C i+1 ⊆ C i is a proper face of C i for each i, and corresponding sequences {T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T n } and {z 1 , . . . , z n } with T 0 = T , T n = {t 1 }, where T i+1 ⊆ T i is compact for each i, such that
In addition, for each i,
This sequence must terminate with C n = {π(t 1 )} and T n = {t 1 }, because C i+1 is a proper face of C i for each i, which implies dim C i+1 ≤ dim C i − 1, and π(t 1 ) is an extreme point of C and thus an extreme point of C i ⊆ C for each i. Then since dim C ≤ S, this construction must eventually terminate with some j such that π(t 1 ) is an exposed point of C j . Now consider T n−1 and T n = {t 1 }. By construction, π(t 1 ) is an exposed point of C n−1 , and
The argument above, with C n−1 in place of C 1 , shows that there is a contract c n−1 (t 1 ) such that
Now we claim, by induction, that for each k = 0, . . . , n−1, there is a contract
To see this, fix i ≥ 0 and suppose there exists c i (t 1 ) such that
Then we claim that there exists c i−1 (t 1 ) such that
To show this, we mimic the argument above. For each t ∈ T i , there exists
is an open cover of the compact set T i , so there exists
and choose α i (t 1 ) > 0 such that
Thus for all t ∈ T i−1 \ {t 1 },
Thus by induction, for each k there exists a contract c k (t 1 ) such that for all t ∈ T k \ {t 1 },
In particular, consider k = 0: there exists c(t 1 ) = c 0 (t 1 ) such that for all
Combining Cases 1 and 2, the collection {c(t) : t ∈ T } as constructed above then satisfies the desired bounds, as by construction, for each t ∈ T :
and for all s = t:
Thus virtual extraction holds.
A careful reading of the previous proof reveals a parallel set of ideas and results about convex sets and their extreme points that helps to illuminate the connection between the extraction problems with finitely and infinitely many types, and which might be of independent interest. We develop these next.
We start with a weaker notion of exposed point for a convex set, motivated by the above construction of contracts for the case when types are not detectable.
Definition 8. Let C be a convex set. A point x ∈ C is eventually exposed if there exists a sequence {F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F n } of subsets of C such that
Note: If C is a convex set and x ∈ C is an exposed point of C, then x is also eventually exposed, using the trivial sequence F 0 = C and F 1 = {x}.
Note: If C is compact and convex and x ∈ C is eventually exposed, then each set F i is compact and convex. In addition, x is an exposed point in the set F n−1 .
Next, we show that while a convex set can have extreme points that are not exposed, every extreme point in a compact, convex subset of R S is eventually exposed.
Theorem 5. Let C be a compact, convex subset of R S . If x ∈ C is an extreme point then it must be eventually exposed.
Proof. Since x ∈ C is an extreme point, there exists z 1 ∈ R S such that
Since x is not an exposed point of C, F 1 is a proper face of C, so dim F 1 < dim C, and dim F 1 ≥ 1.
If x is an exposed point of F 1 , we are done, setting F 2 = {x}. Else, x must be an extreme point of F 1 (since F 1 ⊆ C) that is not exposed. Repeating the above argument, choose z 2 ∈ R S such that
If x is an exposed point of F 2 , we are done. Else, F 2 is a proper face of F 1 and
Repeating this argument, since dim F i ≤ dim F i−1 −1 for each i, eventually must have dim F n = 1, and then because x is an extreme point of F n , must also have x is an exposed point of F n .
Returning to the extraction problem, these definitions and results suggest analogous conditions connecting types to beliefs, and the geometry of the set of beliefs, as with the connection between exposed points and detectable types. First, we extend the notion of a detectable type to a set of types in the natural way.
Next, in analogy with the connection between exposed points and eventually exposed points, there is a natural notion of eventually detectable types. Definition 10. A type t * ∈ T is eventually detectable if there is a nested sequence of compact sets {T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T n } with T 0 = T , T n = {t * }, and T i+1 ⊆ T i for each i, and a corresponding sequence {z 1 , . . . , z n } ⊆ R S such that for each i = 1, . . . , n,
Note: A type t * ∈ T is eventually detectable if there is a nested sequence of compact sets {T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T n }, with T 0 = T , T n = {t * }, and T i+1 ⊆ T i for each i such that T i+1 is detectable in T i for each i.
Note: If t * ∈ T is detectable, then it is eventually detectable, using the trivial sequence T 0 = T , T 1 = {t * }.
Next we show that when S is finite and types satisfy probabilistic independence, then while types need not be detectable, every type is eventually detectable. This in turn guarantees that virtual extraction holds, as we showed in the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 6. Let S be finite.
(i) If every type is eventually detectable, then virtual extraction holds.
(ii) If types satisfy probabilistic independence, then every type is eventually detectable.
Proof. Part (i) follows from the proof of Theorem 4. For (ii), let t * ∈ T . By probabilistic independence, π(t * ) is an extreme point of C. If t * is not detectable, then π(t * ) is an extreme point of C that is not exposed. Hence by Theorem 5, π(t * ) is eventually exposed in C. Thus there is a sequence {F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F n } with F 0 = C, F n = {π(t * )}, and a corresponding sequence {z 1 , . . . , z n } such that for each i, π(t * ) ∈ F i and
Set T 0 = T , and
Note that since T and F 1 are compact and the map t → π(t) is continuous, T 1 is compact. Then for each i ≥ 2, set
By induction, T i is compact for each i, and by construction T i ⊆ T i−1 for each i. Also by construction,
Then let m be the minimum index i for which T i = {t * }. Consider the sequence {T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T m } and the corresponding sequence {z 1 , . . . , z m }. Then for each i = 1, . . . , m,
Thus t * is eventually detectable.
As Example 1 illustrated, full extraction requires that all types are detectable. With infinitely many types however, this is not sufficient for full extraction. We close this section by noting a stronger condition which is sufficient for full extraction in general, and then see that these conditions collapse in the case of finitely many types. Note that if all types are strongly detectable, then full extraction is possible for any t → v(t), and any type set T . This follows from the basic argument for the finite case, as sketched and adapted above. Also note that when T is finite and types satisfy probabilistic independence, which is equivalent to convex independence because T is finite, then all types are strongly detectable. We record these observations below.
Theorem 7. Let S be finite. If all types are strongly detectable, then full extraction holds for any π : T → ∆(S) and any v : T → R.
and inf
Since all types are strongly detectable, such a z(t) exists for each t ∈ T by definition. Then fix t ∈ T , and set c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t) where α(t) > 0 is chosen sufficiently large so that
Such an α(t) > 0 exists since inf s =t π(s) · z(t) > 0.
Then for type t,
by choice of α(t). Repeating this construction for each type t ∈ T yields a menu {c(t) : t ∈ T } that achieves full extraction.
Theorem 8. Let S be finite. If T is finite and types satisfy probabilistic independence, then all types are strongly detectable.
Proof. Fix t ∈ T . Since types satisfy probabilistic independence, π(t) ∈ co{π(s) : s ∈ T, s = t}. Thus there exists z(t) ∈ R S such that
since T is finite. Thus t is strongly detectable by definition. Repeating for each t ∈ T yields the result.
General State Space
In this section we consider the general case in which the state space S is an arbitrary compact metric space. For example, this allows the model to accommodate the case in which S = T , or more generally when |S| ≥ |T |.
We start by again considering the problem of full extraction, and cast the problem in slightly stronger terms (we will see that while this gives a stronger condition, probabilistic independence guarantees that virtual extraction holds under this stronger condition). Rather than looking for a collection of contracts {c(t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T }, we add the requirement that the contracts also be jointly continuous in types and states, and thus consider the existence of a schedule of contracts c ∈ C(T × S) such that for each t ∈ T :
First, we note that full extraction is equivalent to the seemingly weaker condition weak full extraction
We establish this equivalence in the lemma below. Proof. Full extraction clearly implies weak full extraction. To see that these are equivalent, fix v : T → R and t ∈ T . Then choose a sequence s n → t with s n = t for each n; this is possible by the connectedness of T . Suppose c ∈ C(T × S) satisfies weak full extraction. Then for each n, since s n = t,
Since t ∈ T was arbitrary, the equivalence follows.
From Lemma 1, it is enough to consider the relaxed problem of weak full extraction. Now write c(t) = v(t) + z(t)
where z ∈ C(T × S), and we use v(t) ∈ R interchangeably with v(t)1(S), where 1(S) denotes the identity on S. Note that any c ∈ C(T × S) can be written this way for appropriate choice of z. Then c satisfies full extraction if and only if for each t ∈ T ,
This follows from observing that for each t,
Thus we will consider the existence of z ∈ C(T × S) such that for each t ∈ T ,
To that end, let f : T × C(T × S) → R be given by
and for each t ∈ T , let f t : C(T × S) → R be given by f t (z) = f (t, z).
Proof. To see this, first suppose p
In this case, full extraction holds, and thus a fortiori, virtual extraction holds as well. Similarly, if p * = 0, then either p * is realized, in which case again there must exist such a z ∈ C(T × S) as above so that full extraction holds, or if p * is not realized, then for each ε > 0 there exists
Now note that using continuity of π and v, this implies
and for each t ∈ T , set the contract c(t) to be
Then c ∈ C(T × S), and for each t ∈ T ,
and by the preceding argument,
Then fix t ∈ T , and consider s = t.
Thus for all t ∈ T ,
Thus to show that virtual surplus extraction is possible, it suffices to show that p * > 0. We establish this below by considering the dual of the optimization problem (vse), and making use of duality to argue that these problems have the same value. The heart of the proof is then to show that this common value cannot be positive under probabilistic independence.
Theorem 9. Let S be a compact metric space. If types satisfy probabilistic independence, then virtual extraction holds.
Proof. By Lemma 2, to show that virtual surplus extraction is possible it suffices to show that p * > 0. To that end, note that the Lagrange dual function for the problem (vse) is
Using this notation, we can rewrite the Lagrange dual function for (vse) as follows:
Thus the dual problem of (vse) is
Then note that Slater's condition holds for the original problem (vse). To see this, set z = 0, so
Thus p * = d * and in addition d * is obtained, where p * is the optimal value of (vse) and d * is the optimal value of (d-vse).
Now it suffices to show that p * = d * > 0. To show this, suppose by way of contradiction that p
Recall that, by definition,
and f (0) = g(0) = 0, which implies
Since h(λ, ν) > 0, this implies ν · d > 0. Thus ν = 0. Since λ, ν ≥ 0, this implies ν > 0.
Let F : C(T × S) → R be given by
Note that F is convex and continuous, and by definition,
In particular, this implies inf z∈C(T ×S) F (z) ∈ R. By Ekeland's Variational Principle (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix), there exists a sequence {z n } and a sequence {γ n } with γ n ∈ ∂F (z n ) for each n such that
By Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 (see the Appendix), since γ n ∈ ∂F (z n ) for each n, γ n is the measure for which
for any measurable function y. But then note that γ n is constant for each n; let this constant measure be denoted γ. Since γ n → 0, this implies γ = 0, and that γ · y = 0 for any such y.
Now fix A ⊆ T and let y be given by
where 1(S) is the indicator of S. Then
And γ · y = 0, which implies λ(A) − ν(T × A) = 0, that is, λ(A) = ν(T × A). Since A was arbitrary, λ(A) = ν(T × A) for each A ⊆ T . From this it follows first that λ(T ) = ν(T × T ), and since ν > 0, this implies λ(T ) = ν(T × T ) > 0. Then without loss of generality, rescaling if necessary, take λ(T ) = ν(T × T ) = 1. Second, this implies that, using disintegration of measures, we can write
where ν t is a measure on T , ν t ≥ 0 and ν t (T ) = 1 for each t in the support of λ.
Then γ is the measure given by
where for E ⊆ T × S, E t := {s ∈ S : (t, s) ∈ E}.
Then note that γ = sup Recall from above γ = γ(t) λ(dt) = 0
By definition, γ(t) ≥ 0 for each t ∈ T , hence γ(t) = 0 for λ − a.e t ∈ T .
Thus for λ − a.e t ∈ T , γ(t) = π(t) − π(s)ν t (ds) = 0 where ν t ∈ ∆(T ). Thus by probabilistic independence, ν t = δ t for λ − a.e t ∈ T .
But then 
Appendix
Because these results might be of independent interest, we include here the derivation of the version of Ekeland's Variational Principle that we used in the proof of Theorem 9.
Before giving the main result of the appendix, we start with some preliminary definitions and results, including the classic version of Ekeland's Variational Principle, and an extension due to Borwein, from which the main result follows quickly.
Definition 12. For x ∈ dom f and ε > 0, the ε-subdifferential of f at x, denoted ∂ ε f (x) is ∂ ε f (x) = {x * ∈ X * : f (y) ≥ f (x) + x * , y − x − ε ∀y ∈ X} Note: For any x ∈ dom f and any ε > 0,
• ∂ ε f (x) is closed and convex for every x
• inf f ≤ f (x ε ) ≤ inf f + ε ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ ∂ ε f (x ε )
• for ε = 0, ∂ 0 f (x) = ∂f (x)
• if f is convex and lsc, then ∂ ε f (x) = ∅ for every x ∈ dom f
Next we state the classic version of Ekeland's Variational Principle (Ekeland, 1974). More precise approximations can be given for convex functions, as shown by Borwein (1982) .
Theorem 11. (Borwein, 1982 , Theorem 1) Let X be a Banach space and f : X → R ∪ {+∞} be a proper, convex, lsc function. Let ε > 0 and k ≥ 0 be given. Let x * 0 ∈ ∂ ε f (x 0 ) Then there exist x ε and x * ε such that x * ε ∈ ∂f (x ε ) and such that
Putting these two results together yields the following.
Lemma 3. Let X be a Banach space and f : X → R be a proper, convex, lsc function such that inf f > −∞. Then there exists a sequence {x n } in X such that f (x n ) → inf f and d(0, ∂f (x n )) → 0, i.e., there exists {g n } such that g n ∈ ∂f (x n ) for each n and g n → 0.
Proof. For each n ∈ N there exists x n such that inf f ≤ f (x n ) ≤ inf f + 1 4n 2
Then 0 ∈ ∂ 1 4n 2
f (x n ) for each n.
By Borwein (1982, Theorem 1), for each n there existx n andx * n such that (with k = 1 here)x * n ∈ ∂f (x n ) x n − x n ≤ 1 2n and for each t ∈ T , let f t : C(T × S) → R be given by f t (z) = f (t, z). Then f is continuous and f t is convex for each t ∈ T . For each t ∈ T , if γ ∈ ∂f t (z) then γ ∈ M(T × S) is a measure such that for any measurable function y, γ · y = π(t) · y(t)
